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C R S -  1 
I n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 9 ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  a n d  1 2  NATO p a r t n e r s  a g r e e d  t o  
m o d e r n i z e  NATO's t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  b y  r e p l a c i n g  e x i s t i n g  P e r s h i n g  I 
b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  w i t h  a m o r e  a c c u r a t e  a n d  l o n g e r  r a n g e  P e r s h i n g  I 1  ( P - 1 1 )  
w h i l e  a d d i n g  new g r o u n d  l a u n c h e d  c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s .  T h e  d e p l o y m e n t  was s e e n  as  
n e c e s s a r y  t o :  (1) s o l i d i f y  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  U .S .  n u c l e a r  g u a r a n t e e  t o  
E u r o p e ;  ( 2 )  r e s p o n d  t o  S o v i e t  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  o f  i t s  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s ;  
( 3 )  r e p l a c e  o b s o l e s c e n t  W e s t e r n  s y s t e m s ;  a n d  ( 4 )  p r o v i d e  b a r g a i n i n g  l e v e r a g e  
f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  T h e  d e c i s i o n  was l i n k e d ,  t e c h n i c a l l y  
a n d  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  t o  a c o m m i t m e n t  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  t h r e a t  p o s e d  b y  
 he new S o v i e t  s y s t e m s  b y  n e g o t i a t i n g  l i m i t s  o n  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  s y s t e m s  
w i t h i n  t h e  SALT f r a m e w o r k .  
D e v e l o p m e n t s  s i n c e  D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 9  h a v e  e r o d e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  b a s e  f o r  t h e  
d e c i s i o n ,  a n d  a n t i - n u c l e a r  s e n t i m e n t  i n  a n u m b e r  o f  E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a s  
c a l l e d  i n t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d e p l o y m e n t  p l a n .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  P - I 1  
m i s s i l e ' s  t e s t  f a i l u r e s  l e d  t h e  9 7 t h  C o n g r e s s  t o  d e n y  p r o c u r e m e n t  f u n d s  f o r  
t h e  m i s s i l e  u n t i l  i t s  v i a b i l i t y  i s  d e m o n t r a t e d .  
W i t h  d e p l o y m e n t  o f  t h e  new N A T O  m i s s i l e s  s c h e d u l e d  t o  b e g i n  by  t h e  e n d  o f  
1 9 8 3 ,  U . S . - S o v i e t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n  G e n e v a  a r e  i n  a c r i t i c a l  p h a s e .  I f  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  d o  n o t  move  t o w a r d  a g r e e m e n t ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  West t o  d e p l o y  
t h e  new m i s s i l e s  c o u l d  d e p e n d  o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o r  t h e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n  i s  v i e w e d  a s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  r e a c h  a g r e e m e n t .  
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BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
NATO'S December 1979 Decision 
In December 1979, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
decided to modernize the Europe-based U.S. nuclear arsenal by deploying (in 
1983 at the earliest) a total of 572 new ground-launched systems capable of 
reaching Soviet territory from West European sites. The deployment would 
consist of 108 Pershing I1 ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise 
missiles, all with single nuclear warheads. The missiles would be deployed 
in five European countreis: P-11s and cruise missiles in West Germany; 
cruise missiles only in the U.K., Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The 
allies also agreed to attempt to negotiate with the Soviet Union East-West 
. limitations on theater nuclear forces in the context of SALT. The NATO 
decision, therefore, was an integrated or dual-track approach involving both 
modernization and arms control. (For a detailed discussion of the decision 
see the CRS report, entitled The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater 
Nuclear Forces, published by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Dec. 31, 
1980, C.P. 1156.) 
The communique issued following the NATO decision stated that "all the 
nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will 
participate in the program." The consensus represented by this statement had 
been achieved through a process of intense preparation and C O n S ~ l t a t i ~ n  
during the two years preceding the decision. But the apparent unanimity of 
the communique concealed serious reservations on the part of several smaller 
countries, caused by widespread uneasiness among significant sections of 
their public and parliamentary opinion toward the introduction of additional 
nuclear weapons into Europe. Governments of two countries selected for 
deployment, Belgium and the Netherlands, agreed to the decision but both 
submitted reservations concerning the deployment of missiles on their 
territory. 
The proposal to modernize NATO's nuclear forces revived two basic issues 
confronting the Alliance: first, how to sustain the credibility of the 
American nuclear guarantee given differing American and European attitudes 
toward the role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy; and second, how to 
reconcile the demands of NATO's dual policy of defense and detente, 
particularly how to determine the appropriate role for arms control 
negotiations in ensuring Western security. 
NATO'S Nuclear Dilemma 
Almost since its inception the alliance has struggled with the problem of 
how most effectively to extend the protection of American strategic nuclear 
power to the defense of Western Europe. The United States is committed to 
assist in the defense of its European allies, though the ultimate fulfillment 
of this commitment could result in the destruction of American society. This 
situation has inevitably produced different perceptions between Europe and 
the United States concerning what constitutes an appropriate and credible 
strategy of deterrence, and the forces needed to support it. 
P . ~ ~ ~ ~  - - -  yeans, c3nsclous that azy war, nuclear or eonventional, could 
s e v a s ~ i z a  Z d r c ~ e ,  have zended to advocaze a scrategy of absolute deterrence 
tzrougn the ~rnmedlace ~ h r e a t  of all-out ncclear war. They have looked wlth 
susplclon at any development that appeared to distract from thls ultimate 
:Pareat, or t2at appeared to "decouple" Europe from the American strategic 
nuclear quarantee. 
The United States, equally conscious of the awesome consequences for 
American territory of strategic nuclear war, has sought to avoid being faced 
wich the choice of all-out nuclear war or defeat. American officials have 
increasingly emphasized the need to deter conflict at all possible levels 
through the provision of a wide range of capabilities and options. They have 
endeavored to look "beyond" deterrence, and, in the event that deterrence 
should fail, to facilitate :9e satisfactory termination of any conflict short 
of all-out nuclear war. This approach has led to a search for flexibility 
and "credible," or more usable options. 
The NATO decision attempted to deal with these conflicting perspectives by 
providing more flexible nuclear systems -- in response to the American 
requirement -- which nonetheless, in their ability to strike Soviet 
territory, could be seen as strengthening the link between the European 
theater and the strategic nuclear standoff -- in response to the European 
requirement. 
According to the decision's rationale, deterrence for Europe would be 
strengthened because the Soviet Union, in contemplating any attack on Western 
Europe, would be forced to calculate that the West might respond by striking 
Soviet territory with the new systems. And, in using the systems, the West 
would know that the Soviet Union might respond by striking American, not 
European, targets. Therefore, both sides would be aware that hostilities in 
the European theater might escalate rapidly to a strategic exchange that 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would desire. 
Toward Preliminary Negotiations 
As NATO moved toward its decision, Soviet President Brezhnev announced, on 
Oct. 6 ,  1979, a package of arms control initiatives including an offer to 
limit deployment of SS-20 missiles if NATO would defer its decision to deploy 
new Western systems. When NATO went ahead in any case, Moscow said that the 
decision had destroyed any possibility for negotiations on theater nuclear 
systems. 
The potential for negotiations received another serious setback when, on 
December 24, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. As part of the American 
response, President Carter asked the Senate to suspend consideration of the 
SALT I 1  treaty, effectively putting U.S.-Soviet arms control discussions in 
limbo. 
The Soviet Union for the next six months continued to assert that the NATO 
decision had removed all prospects for theater nuclear arms control. But, on 
July 1 ,  1980, during a visit by West German Chancellor Schmidt to Moscow, 
President Brezhnev relented and said that the Soviet Union was prepared to 
enter negotiations at any time. Subsequent contacts between U.S. and Soviet 
representatives led to preliminary negotiations in October 1980. 
2 2  2 c z .  1 5 ,  1 5 E 0 ,  U.S.  a n d  S o v ; s t  r e ? r e s e n c a t l v e s   me^ ~ n  G e n e v a  f o r  
p r e l l m ~ n a r y  n e g o t ~ a t l o n s .  X e  : t a k a  c o n t ~ n u e d  f o r  a S o d t  a n o n t h  b u t  r s s d l t e d  
-pi a q r e e m e n ~  ~ o  r e e t  a q a l :  i n  t r . ~  r ~ z , r e  t o  z o n z ~ n d e  c n e  a ~ s c u s s i o n s .  
As e x p e c t e d ,  t n e  t w o  s ~ d e s  d ~ s a g r e e e  f r o m  t n e  o u t s e t  c o n c e r n ~ n g  w h l c h  w e a p o n s  
s y s t e m s  s h o u l d  b e  included l n  t h e  n e g o z ~ a t ; o n s .  ~ 3 e  ~ . S . / N A T O  p o s l t l o n  w a s  
t n a t ,  on  t h e  W e s t e r n  s l d e ,  o n l y  ?Fie ~ l a n n e d  G L C X  a n d  P e r s h l n g  2  u n l t s  w e r e  
negotiable, a n d  c a l l e d  f o r  l l ~ , l t a t ; o c s  on t h e  S o v l e t  U n l o n l s  L R T N ?  p o t e n c l a l  
-- p r l m a r l l y  t n e  S S - 2 0  S L ~  a l s o  l n c l ~ d l n g  t h e  o l d e r  SS-4  a n 2  S S - 5  --  a n d  o n  
t h e  B a c k f ~ r e  b o m S e r .  T h e  S c v l e t  U n l o n  s a l d  t n a t  a l l  .Arnerlcan s y s t e m s  c a p a b l e  
o f  s t r l k l r , g  S o v r e t  territory f r o m  E u r o p e a n  b a s e s ,  s u c h  a s  F B - 1 1 1  b o m b e r s  
stationed 19 t h e  U . K . ,  o r  f r c n  a l r c r a f t  c a r r l e r s  l n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  r e g l o n ,  
s q o u l d  b e  l n c l u d e d  ~ n  t h e  n e g o t l a t l o c s .  
T h e  G e n e v a  t a l k s  c l o s e d  i n  t h e  w a k t  o f  t h e  v i c t o r y  o f  R o n a l d  R e a g a n  o v e r  
Jimmy C a r t e r  i n  t h e  U.S .  P r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n s .  T h e  t a l k s  h a d  c l e a r l y  
c o n f i r n e d  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o n  t h e a t e r  s y s t e m s  w o u l d  b e  c o m p l e x  a n d  
p o t e n t i a l l y  p r o l o n g e d .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  n e x t  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
h a d  o p p o s e d  t h e  SALT I 1  t r e a t y  a n d  was o p e n l y  s k e p t i c a l  a b o u t  a r m s  c o n t r o l  
r a i s e d  e v e n  m o r e  s e r i o u s  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  N A T O  D e c e m b e r  
1 3 7 9  d e c i s i o n .  
A n t i - N u c l e a r  S e n t i m e n t  i n  E u r o p e :  U .S .  a n d  S o v i e t  R e s p o n s e s  
T h e  r e s u r g e n t  a n t i - n u c l e a r  m o v e m e c ~  i n  E u r o p e  h a s  b e e n  a  m a j o r  f a c t o r  
a f f e c t i n g  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  i m p l e r n e n t a t i c n  o f  t h e  N A T O  LRTNF d e c i s i o n .  I n  t h e  
l a t e  1 9 5 0 s  a n d  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 ~ ~  t h e r e  was a n  a c t i v e  a n t i - n u c l e a r  m o v e m e n t  i n  
G r e a t  B r i t a i n  a n d  i n  some o t h e r  West  E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  m o v e m e n t  
r e c e d e d  a s  p r o t e s t  m o v e m e n t s  f i r s t  s w i t c h e d  i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s  t o  V i e t n a m  i s s u e s  
a n d  t h e n  v i r t u a l l y  d i s a p p e a r e d  f r o m  s i g h t  w i t h  t h e  a d v e n t  o f  t h e  e r a  o f  
d e z e n t e  a n d  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
I n  a d v a n c e  o f  t h e  N A T O  d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  m o v e m e n t  was a t t r a c t i n g  s u p p o r t  
m a i n l y  f r o m  t r a d i t i o n a l  a n t i - n u c l e a r  q u a r t e r s  i n c l u d i n g  a s p i l l o v e r  a s s i s t  
f r o m  t h e  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  p e a c e f u l  u s e s  o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r .  B u t  by  e a r l y  1 9 8 1 ,  
t h e  a n t i - n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  c o u l d  c l a i m  s ~ g n i f i c a n t  p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t  i n  a  n u m b e r  
o f  c r u c i a l  W e s t  E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s .  
A number  o f  f a c t o r s  h a v e  e n c o u r a g e d  s e n t i m e n t  a g a i n s t  new m i s s i l e  
d e p l o y m e n t s .  T h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  SALT I 1  a g r e e m e n t ,  t h e  S o v i e t  i n v a s i o n  o f  
A f g h a n i s t a n ,  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t  e s c a l a t i c n  o f  t e n s i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
a n d  c h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  l e d  many E u r o p e a n s  t o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  i t  w a s  n o  l o n g e r  
p r u d e n t  t o  d e p e n d  s o l e l y  o n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  t o  C o n t r o l  
t h e  a c c e l e r a t i n g  arms r a c e .  F u r t h e r ~ . o r e ,  A m e r i c a n  p r e s s u r e s  f o r  i n c r e a s e d  
E u r o p e a n  d e f e n s e  s p e n d i n g  a g a i n s t  a L a c k g r o u n d  o f  s t a g n a n t  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  
h a v e  c a l l e d  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  c u t s  i n  s o c i a l  p r o g r a m s  t h a t  m i g h t  b e  r e q u i r e d  
t o  s q u a r e  t h e  b u d g e t a r y  c i r c l e .  The  n u c l e a r  i s s u e  h a s  p r o v i d e d  a  c l e a r  a n d  
e m o t i v e  f o c u s  f o r  t h a t  a t t e n t i o n .  
Two a d d i t i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s  d u r i n ~  t h e  C a r t e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  
E u r o p e a n  c o n c e r n  t h a t  U.S.  s t r a t e g y  was  m o v i n g  t o w a r d  a  n u c l e a r  w a r f i g h t i n g  
p o s t u r e  f o r  E u r o p e .  F i r s t ,  t h e  o n - a n d - o f f  a g a i n  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  C a r t e r  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  d e p l o y m e n t  3 f  e n h a n c e d  r a d i a t i o n  w e a p o n s  ( " n e u t r o n  
b o m b s n )  i n  E u r o p e  s u g g e s t e d  t o  many E u r o p e a n s  t h a t  A m e r i c a n  w e a p o n s  
t e c h n c l o g y  was m o v i n g  i n  a  n u c l e a r  w a r f i g h t l n g  d i r e c t i o n .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  
a n n o u n c e m e n t  i n  1 9 8 0  o f  a new U . S .  n u z l o a r  s t r ~ t e g y  f e a t u r i n g  m o r e  f l e x i b l e  
- -. ,arget~ng options ( P i j  53) tended tc c~r?.f:rn znaz strazeqy as well as weapons 
2eTJelop~,ect >jere movlrc toward a pcsture unacceptable to aany Europeans. 
In 138i, chese doubts recelved a d d ~ t l o n a l  lmperus frcm :he dellberate pace 
that characterized the r,ew Amerlcan Adnlnlstrat;onfs approach to developlnq 
arns coctrol p o l ~ c ~ e s .  This approach suggested to many E ~ r o p e a n s  that tne 
Unlted States was not serlous absdt reduclng nuclear armaments, relnforclng 
t?e argcnents ~ a d e  3y tne leaders of the antl-nuclear movement. President 
Reagan's remarks on Oct. 1 6  concern:ng the potentla1 for llmized nuclear war 
~n Europe provlded addltlonal ammunltlon for S o v ~ e t  propaganda, a s  drd 
subsequent stazements by Sezretarles E a ~ g  and Wernberger. Sovlet leader 
Brezhnev responded that, unlixe Preszdent Reagan, ne could not lmaglne a 
n > ~ c l e a r  confllct belng ilmlted to Enrope. 
The Soviet Union has actively sought to encourage the growth of 
anti-nuclear sentiment in Western Zurope. In his report to the 26th Party 
Congress on Feb. 23, 1961, the late Soviet President Brezhnev proposed a 
noratoriun on deployment in Exrope of new medium-range nuclear facilities of 
the NATO countries and the Soviet Union. In a second major initiative, the 
Soviet Union for the first time suggested that it might be willing to include 
some Soviet territory in a nuclear free z o n e  in the Scandinavian region. 
In addition, a number of Soviet commentaries have emphasized the 
potentially destabilizing aspects of the Pershing I1 missile. The Soviets 
argue that, while modernization of their theater forces constitutes no threat 
to the viability of U.S. central strategic capabilities, the extended-range 
Pershing I1 missile will be a "fir st-skrike" weapon, capable of striking 
Soviet targets in less than five minutes flying time from West Germany. 
(Whlie the Pershing 11 deployment could not take out a significant portion of 
Mascow's strategic forces, i t  could threaten Soviet command and control and, 
with changes in the payload c o n f i g ~ r a t i o n  to extend the missile's range, put 
in jeopardy the Russian national command authority. Configured a s  planned, 
?Toscow would not be within the range of Pershing I1 missiles fired from West 
Germany). 
At the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting o n  May 4-5, 1981, U.S. 
Secretary of State Haig reported a decision by President Reagan which, 
according to some sources, was reached virtually on the eve of the meeting 
following bloody infighting within the Administration. This decision was 
incorporated in the NATO communique which announced that the United States 
would "begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF arms control within 
the SALT framework by the end of the year." O n  Sept. 24, the United States 
and the Soviet Union announced that negotiations would begin on Nov. 30 in 
Geneva. 
On Nov. 1 8 ,  President Reagan announced i n  a major foreign policy address 
that the United States would in the Geneva negotiations seek total 
elimination of Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 mlssiles in return for 
cancellation of NATO's deployment plans --  a so-called "zero-option.'' The 
President said that American negotiators would be willing to listen to and 
discuss Soviet proposals. H e  also said that his administration would seek to 
open Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the Soviet Union "as soon as 
possible" in 1982. 
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POLICY QUESTIONS A N D  VARIABLES 
Implementation of the December 1979 decision remains the most sensitive 
security issue on the NATO agenda. The issue touches the core of the U.S. 
commitment to the alliance, exposes the differing American and European 
perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, is a severe test 
of Western solidarity, and could have long-term ramifications for the future 
of European arms control and East-West relations. There are a number of 
countervailing pressures on the decision, the combination of which raises 
serious questions about how the decision will be implemented. 
WHAT ROLE DOES THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE PLAY? 
No attempt is made here to analyze the balance. The purpose is simply to 
refer to the differing perspectives on the nature of the balance and to 
suggest some of the factors that make defining the balance a highly 
subjective process. 
First, theater nuclear weapons serve different purposes in NATO nuclear 
strategy than they do in Warsaw Pact strategy. Given different strategic 
assumptions about the purposes such weapons would serve and what missions 
they would be assigned, neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact have in the past 
attempted to develop systems that mirror those of the opposition. 
In Soviet strategy, the systems probably are intended to ensure that no 
future war is fought on Soviet territory, to help deter Western use of 
nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact, and to ensure the best possible 
ratio of Eastern and Western forces in peacetime as well as to provide 
coverage of key West European targets in a war. Nuclear weapons are fully 
integrated into Soviet doctrine and force structures. 
Only in recent years has NATO attempted to develop concepts and plans that 
integrate nuclear weapons into the potential battlefieid. NATO planning has 
remained a compromise between deterrence and warfighting requirements. 
Western sources frequently explain the new NATO LRTNF as a response to the 
SS-20 deployments (now estimated at 340 missiles with some 1,020 warheads). 
This is misleading. The new U.S. systems are intended in no way as direct 
military counters to the SS-20. Rather, they are designed to serve NATO 
strategy by strengthening the linkage to the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee 
while providing Western authorities with a more flexibile range of options 
with which to deal with any Warsaw Pact attack. The new systems are a 
response to the SS-20 primarily in a symbolic political sense. 
Second, it is impossible to talk about the theater balance in isolation 
from the overall strategic balance. To the Soviet Union, the new NATO 
systems would constitute a strategic threat in that they could strike targets 
on Soviet territory. From the Western perspective, all the targets that 
could be struck by the new Western theater systems could be (or are) 
targetted by U.S. central strategic systems as well. And, a small portion of 
the U.S. submarine ballistic missile force is dedicated to NATO theater 
missions in time of war. 
Furthermore, President Reagan's strategic weapons program includes the 
stationing of large numbers of nuclear-armed cruise missiles at sea. 
Depending on where the carriers of such missiles are patrolling, these 
T h e  a n a l y s e s  o n  w h i c h  NATO h a s  b a s e d  i t s  deploy men^ p l a n s  a n d  arms c o n t r c l  
a p p r o a c h e s  h a v a  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  n u m e r i c a l  a d v a n t a g e  i n  t h e  t h e a c e r  now 
e n j o y e d  S y  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  i s  a  s e v e r e  t h r e a t  t o  N A T O ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  d e t e r  a 
c o n f l i c t  i n  E u r o p e  o r  t o  c o n t r o l  n u c l e a r  e s c a l a t i o n  s h o u l d  a c o n f l i c t  b e g i n .  
T h i s  j u d g m e n t  d e r i v e s  i n  p a r t  f r o m  t i - ~ e  c a n c l u s i o n  t h a t  N A T O ' s  c o n v e n t i o n a l  
f o r c e s  m i q h ~  b e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b l u n t  a d e t e r m i n e d  W a r s a w  P a c t  a s s a u l t  a n d  
t h a t  N A T O  m i g h t  b e  f o r c e d  e a r l y  i n  a c o n f l i c t  t o  c h o o s e  b e t w e e n  s a c r i f i c e  o f  
l a r g e  p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  o r  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  a  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  
e x c h a n g e .  I n  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  NATO e x p e r t s ,  w i t h o u t  t h e  n e v  W e s t e r n  s y s t e m s  
t h e  A l l i a n c e  i s  i n  n o  p o s i t i o n  t o  i n i t i a t e  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  s y s t e m s  
w i t h o u t  r e c e i v i n g  a m c r e  d a m a g i n g  c o u n t e r  b l o w  f r o m  S o v i e t  t h e a t e r  s y s t e m s .  
M o s t  W e s t e r n  a n a l y s e s  a c c e p t  t h e  p r e m i s e  t h a t  t h e  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  b a l a n c e  
i s  s h i f t i n g  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  Warsaw P a c t .  W e s t e r n  a n a l y s t s  f i n d  t h i s  s h i f t  
disturbing, p a r t i c u l a r l y  g i v e n  t h e  Warsaw P a c t ' s  t r a d i t i o n a l  a d v a n t a g e s  o v e r  
N A T O  i n  c o n v e n t i o n a l  f o r c e s  a n d  t h e  d i s a p p e a r a n c e  o f  t h e  U . S .  e d g e  o v e r  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  i n  s t r a t e g i c  s y s t e m s .  T h e  I n c e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  
S t u d i e s  i n  i t s  m o s t  r e c e n t  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  b a l a n c e  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t :  
e v e n  w i t h  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  P o s e i d e n / T r i d e n t  
a l l o c a t e d  b y  t h e  U . S .  t o  N A T O  o n  t h e  W e s t e r n  
s i d e  a n d  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  e x c l u s i o n  o f  S o v i e t  
s t r a t e g i c  s y s t e m s ,  t h e  b a l a n c e  i s  d i s t i n c t l y  
u n f a v o r a b l e  t o  NATO a n d  i s  b e c o m i n g  m o r e  s o .  
( T h e  I I S S  a s  w e l l  a s  m o s t  o t h e r  a n a l y s e s  i n c l u d e  t h e  B r i t i s h  a n d  F r e n c h  
n u c l e a r  c a p a b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e i r  b a l a n c e  ~ a l C U l a t i O n S . )  
T!?e S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  c o n t e n d s  t h a t  a  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  
S a i a n c e  a l r e a d y  e x i s t s  a n d  t h a t  S o v i e t  d e p i o y m e n t  o f  n e w  s y s t e m s  h a s  n o t  
u p s e t  t h a t  b a l a n c e .  P r e s i d e n t  B r e z h n e v ,  i n  h i s  O c t o b e r  1 9 7 9  s p e e c h  s a i d  
t h a t :  
T h e  n u m b e r  o f  m e d i u m - r a n g e  n u c l e a r  d e l i v e r y  
w e a p o n s  o n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a s  n o t  b e e n  
i n c r e a s e d  b y  e v e n  o n e  m i s s i l e ,  o r  o n e  a i r p l a n e ,  
o v e r  t h e  p a s t  1 0  y e a r s .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  l a u n c h e r s  o f  m e d i u m - r a n g e  m i s s i i e s  
a n d  a l s o  t h e  y i e l d  o f  t h e  n u c l e a r  c h a r g e s  o f  
t h e s e  m i s s i l e s ,  h a v e  e v e n  b e e n  s o m e w h a t  
r e d u c e d .  
M o s c o w  a l s o  a r g u e s  t h a t  b o t h  F r a n c e  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  w i l l  b e  a d d i n g  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  t h e i r  n u c l e a r  s t r i k i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  n e x t  1 0  y e a r s  a n d  
t h a t  t h e s e  s y s t e m s  m u s t  b e  c o u n t e d  i n  W e s t e r n  t h e a t e r  f o r c e s .  
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a s k i n g  w h e t h e r  a n  h y p o t h e t i c a l  " t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  
b a l a n c e "  c a n  b e  a c h i e v e d ,  i t  m a y  b e  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t o  a s k  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  
V a r i o u s  p o s s i b l e  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  NATO d e p l o y m e n t / a r m s  c o n t r o l  d e c i s i o n  w i l l  
C o n t r i b u t e  t o  a m o r e  s t a b l e  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  t h e a t e r  -- 
w h i c h ,  o f  c o u r s e  i s  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  c o n v e n t i o n a l  f o r c e s  a s  w e l l .  
I n  3z. l  c a s e ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  i n t i m a t e  r e l a t i ~ n s h i ~  S e t w e e n  t h e a t e r  a n d  
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strategrc nuclear systems and d o c ~ r l n e s  --  for tne Unlted States and the 
Sovlet Un;on -- both questions can only be answered ;n the context of a 
s ~ a ~ l e  r lationsnrp ~ e ~ w e e n  6 . S .  ana Sa~ie: scrazeglc rcrces. 5 .  and 
Sovlec strateglc force planning and the fate of strateglc arms negotiations, 
therefore, will be essential components ln the evolution of the theater 
nuclear equatron. 
WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION? 
The December 1979 decision was taken by all the allies participating in 
NATO's integrated command structure, but only six countries are directly 
involved in the deployment: the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, the U.K., and 
West Germany, which were designated to accept stationing of the systems on 
their territory; and the U.S., which is developing and will c ~ n t r o l  the 
systems. A number of factors, some unique to individual ccuntries, and 
others shared in common, could raise serious problems for the current 
deployment plans. 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is the weakest link in the plan for deployment of new 
nuclear systems, even with the advent late in 1982 of a center-right 
government which favors making preliminary preparations for eventual 
deployment in Holland. The Dutch make consistently high quality 
contributions to NATO military programs and public opinion in the Netherlands 
strongly supports continued membership in NATO. But there is equally strong 
traditional opposition to nuclear weapons in Holland. This sentiment was 
taken into account in the original Dutch agreement to the plan in the sense 
that Dutch participation was made contingent on the ratification of the SALT 
I1 agreement and the outcome of negotiations on theater nuclear systems. 
The Dutch government has applauded the zero-option initiative, but it has 
postponed a final deployment decision pending results of U.S.-Soviet 
negotiations. Barring unforeseen upheavals in European threat perceptions, 
the only way that cruise missiles could be deployed in the Netherlands would 
likely be in the context of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the 
United States which limited such systems and offered the prospect for future 
reduction or elimination of theater nuclear weapons. 
Belgium 
The Belgian government has also postponed a final decision on accepting 
cruise missiles and is committed to review the question every six months. 
Belgium nonetheless apparently has taken some initial steps toward 
implementation of the plan. coalition government, led by Wilfried Martens, a 
Flemish Social Belgium's coalition government has confirmed its adherence to 
NATO's December 1979 decision. The government will reassess the situation 
every six months based on developments in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations. 
Given that deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium is unpopular with the 
public and is objected to by the socialists, the main opposition to the 
government in parliament, the government will likely postpone a final 
decision as long as possible. 
Italy 
Italy still seems likely to accept stationing of new cruise missiles on 
lcs ~ e r r l t o r y ,  and work Loward implementation of the deployment d e c ~ s i o n  is 
underway. The program of the coalition government forned in the fall of 1982 
by Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, a Christian Democrat, includes adherence 
to the December 1979 decision. The anti-nuclear movement has not yet posed a 
serious threat to Italy's continued willingness to accept cruise missiles, 
even though some public opinion surveys show that Itaiian opposing deployment 
of cruise missiles in Sicily outnumber those in favor by a narrow margin. 
The Italian Communist Party opposes the deployment. The PCI's opposition has 
been muted by its continuing desire to be regarded as a trustworthy partner 
in some future Italian government, but the growth of the anti-nuclear 
movement in northern Europe among non-communist parties appears now to have 
emboldened the PCI. The Socialist Party is participating in the government 
and supports the NATO decision. 
United Kingdom 
In spite of strong anti-nuclear opposition, work has begun toward 
preparation of cruise missile deployment sites. The participation of the 
U.K. in NATO's deployment plans coincides with the decision by the Thatcher 
government to modernize Britain's nuclear deterrent with the Trident missile 
system. These two decisions against the backdrop of a guns-versus-butter 
debate in the economically hard-pressed U.K. have revitalized the 
anti-nuclear movement. The movement finds political support primarily within 
the Labour Party which in recent years has moved distinctly to the left. The 
commitment of a government formed by Labour to the deployment would be 
uncertain, at best. The term of the current parliament runs until May 1984, 
but Mrs. Thatcher, riding the crest of a wave of renewed electoral strength 
following victory in the Falklands, is widely expected to call elections 
early, perhaps in the fall of 1983. In sum, it would appear that deployment 
plans will be able to proceed in the U.K. The government, however, cannot 
afford to be insensitive to public pressure and would no doubt be pleased if 
U.S.-Soviet negotiations led to limitations on the deployment of cruise 
missiles in the U.K. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
The German government has begun preparations for stationing cruise and 
Pershing I1 missiles on German territory. As in so many NATO issues, Germany 
is the pivotal participant in the long-range theater nuclear force 
deployment. While other states are scheduled to receive only cruise 
missiles, Germany is supposed to host both cruise missiles and the full 
deployment of the Pershing I1 missiles. A number of elements in the NATO 
decision were designed to take German requirements into account. West German 
leaders did not want the Soviet Union to be able to single Germany out as the 
target for a campaign against the new systems. Bonn therefore required that 
the NATO decision be unanimous and that at least one other continental 
European non-nuclear weapons country accept stationing of systems. Bonn also 
said that it did not want to participate in a two-key system of Control for 
the weapons. 
Germany already is host to the highest concentration of nuclear and 
conventional weapons of any NATO country other than the United States. It 
also provides the territory that would be the major battleground for any 
future war in Europe. It is no surprise, therefore, that the NATO decision 
r c F - i v -  ,,a an e n o t ~ o n a l  and divisive issue in Gernany. 
fil- znree major Lest Gaz~ai-. pol-:ica- ?arz l2s :ont,~de ~3 supporc the X A T 3  
d u a l - c r a c ~  declslon, a;though clear drfferences nave surfaced concernrng how 
that declslon should S e  rrnplemented. TP-ese drfferences have become an 
important element ~n the carnpalgn for the parlramentary electrons scheduled 
for !$ar. 6, 1963. If the radlcal "Green" party should replace the Llberals 
(FDP) a s  the plvotal thrrd party ln the Bundestag, the p o l ~ t l c a l  context for 
the INF could change fundamentally. 
The ruling Christian Democrats, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, strongly 
support the decision, with some emphasis on the requirement for proceeding 
with the deployment in view of the rapid Soviet deployment of SS-20s. The 
Free Democratic Party, junior partner in the governing coalition, is led by 
Foreign Minister Genscher, who has been a strong supporter of the decision 
but who now is encouraging attempts at compromise in the Geneva negotiations. 
A significant minority in Genscher's party sympathizes with the anti-nuclear 
movement and the party strongly favors an arms control solution to the Soviet 
theater nuclear threat. 
The opposition Social Democratic Party has been badly divided over the 
deployment issue. Former Chancellor Schmidt, who can personally claim a t  
least partial credit for the evolution of NATO's decision, remains firm in 
his support for the dual track approach. T o  his left within the party, 
however, there is increasing resistance to the deployment of new nuclear 
weapons on German territory. In opposition, the party's position has become 
more critical of deployment plans. The party's candidate for the 
Chancellorship, Hans Jochen Vogel, returned from a trip to Moscow encouraged 
that Soviet flexibility should make some arms control agreement possible. 
Given the special security relationship between Germany and the United 
States, the West German government would find i t  difficult to renege on its 
commitment to accept new systems. But a political imperative for any German 
government, even o n e  led by the Christian Democrats, would be an alliance 
policy which places a high priority on arms control. 
Furthermore, given the mounting concern in Germany about uncertain 
prospects for arms control and increasing risks of nuclear war, i t  seems 
unlikely that any German government could afford politically to accept more 
systems than those already programmed for deployment in Germany. Therefore, 
should the Netherlands (and possibly Belgium) not accept cruise missile 
deployment, it currently seems unlikely that those systems could be shifted 
to German sites. 
United States 
Prior to 1982, there had been relatively little political opposition in 
the United States to the deployment of new theater nuclear systems in Europe. 
The potential for a more general peace movement was demonstratec! in November 
1981 when anti-nuclear meetings were held a t  universities across the country. 
And, i n  March 1982, proposals for a nuclear "freezet' gained support among a 
substantial minority in the Congress and a t  the grass rools level i n  town 
meetings in a number of States. Whether such a movement develops significant 
support will likely depend on the credibility of the Administration's arms 
control efforts. 
There are technical problems, however, that could affect the timing Of the 
It remains an open question whether the Betherlanes will accept staticzirq 
of new cruise missiles on its territory any time ic the foreseeable future. 
There is also some queszion about stationing in Belgium. Deplayments in 
these two countries, however, are not scheduled until later in the deploymen: 
prografi. Anti-nuclear sentiment in the C.K. and Wes: Germany does not 
presently threaten their participation in the deployment, bct a decisisn by 
either gcvsrnment to accept additional systems is probaSly ouz sf t h e  
question. In West Germany, elections in Yarch 1983 coule have a crucial 
effect on Seraan policy toward deployments. Possible shifts in the policy of 
the Social Democrats and the growing strength of the anti-nuclear "Greenii 
movement are important variables, but for  he tine being 8 o n n 1 s  c3nmitment to 
NATO deployment plans remains firm. It i s  uncertain whether Italy would be 
willing and/or aSle co accept additional cruise missile deployments. T - L  - is 
clear that all the governments ir.vo1ved would welcome the negotiation cf 
limits on or elinination of Soviet and American long-range theater nuclear 
forces, and they need a credible U.S. negotiatinq perforxance to help keep 
anti-nuclear sentiment within politically manageable limits. 
THE NZGOTIATING FRAXEUORK 
It is a fact of life in Western democracies that imporcant decisions 
relating to national security must ultimately stand the test of popular 
acceptance, if not approval. This is without question true in the case of 
NATO's dual track decision. In the ensuing months, a number of factors coal: 
affect the NATO decision --  some could reinforce the political viability of 
the decision; others could undermine its validity. 
U.S. anC Soviet Positions 
Perhaps the most important variable currently affecting the deployment 
decision is U.S. and Soviet policy toward arms control negotiations. This 
question has two aspects: first, the intrinsic political importance of 
negotiations for European public opinion; and second, the prospects for the 
negotiatlons themselves. 
From the perspective of West European public opinion, the Soviet Union has 
since mid-1980 asserted its willingness to engage in substantive negotiations 
and has nade a number of proposals which, while substantively of limited 
interest to the West, have nonetheless increased the credibility of Moscow's 
position. The Reagan Administration, however, came into office promising to 
review the entire range of U.S. arns control policy and to give arms ccntrol 
a lower priority relative to defense programs. This approach, combined with 
the Administration's deliberate pace in shaping arns control policy, produced 
considerable skepticism in Western Europe concerning the intentions of ths 
Administration. 
In 1981, President 2eagan chose a negotiating approach thac was responsive 
to soxe of the concerns of the anti-nuclear protestors. Bnt those in the 
movement who are firm in c5eir convistion thzt tnere sncuid oe T L ~  n w  Yestern 
deployments and wLo remain skeptLczl about U.S. intentions undoubteely will 
- .  c ~ n c i n ~ ~  to a q l t a t ~  agalnst cne :,ex systems. -neir r a n ~ s  z o u l Z  ,?;.:e agzin 
swell if <he kdmrnistration does not appear forthcoming in its re;?onse E G  
Soviet arms concrcl overtures. 
What now are the prospects for control of theater 3uclear arns? I t  was 
always anticipated that negotiations on theater nuclear systems would be even 
more complicated and difficult than on central strategic systems. The Reagan 
Administration has taken a "simple" approach in selecting the zero-option 
proposal. And, the negotiations began with both sides emphasizing thelr 
intention to negotiate seriously and their desire to reach agreement. But it 
was always hard to believe that the Soviet Union would agree to dismantle all 
of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles in return for cancellation of the 
NATO deployment decision. 
In Zanuary 1982, both sides formally presented proposals for a n  eventual 
agreement. The United States put on the table a draft treaty incorporating 
the zero-option proposal. The Soviet Union proposed a phased reduction of 
"all medium-range nuclear weapons, i.e., with a range (the combat radius) of 
action of 1 , 0 0 0  KM and more deployed in the territory of Europe and in che 
adjacent waters or intended for use in Surope." 
While the details of the negotiations are secret, both sides have made 
available basic information concerning their proposals. The following lines 
summarize the initial negotiating positions of the two sides, a s  far as they 
are publicly known, on critical issues. 
(1) Starting assumptions on balance -- 
U.S.: Soviet Union has 6-1 advantage. 
Soviet: Approximate balance exists. 
(2) Coverage by systems -- 
U.S.: First-stage agreement limited to U.S. and Soviet 
intermediate-range missiles; inclusion of aircraft 
viewed a s  too complicated; noncircumvention clause 
regarding shorter range Soviet missiles. 
Soviet: Include medium-range missiles and "forward-based 
nuclear capable aircraft. 
(3) Coverage by territory -- 
U.S.: Global limits. 
Soviet: Only systems in Europe (west of Ural mountains). 
(4) Coverage by nationality --  
U.S.: Limited to U.S. and Soviet systems. 
Soviet: British and French systems included on 
Western totals. 
(5) Scope (and timing) of reductions -- 
U.S.: Destruction of all Soviet SS-20, SS-4, SS-5 
missile systems; U.S. forgoes deployment of 
ground-launched cruise and 2ershing I 1  ballistic 
missiles. 
Soviet: Starting from current position of balance, 
both sides reduce to total of 6 0 0  medium-range 
systems by 1985, 300 by 1990; Soviets willing to 
eliminate a l l  nuclear weapons from Europe if West 
w o o i d  a g r e e ;  S o v l e ~ s  w l l l ~ n g  T O  make u n ~ l a t e r a l  
r e d u c t l e n s  while n e g o t ~ a t i o n s  l n  p r o g r e s s  ~ f  N A T O  
i A A 1  d e f e r  new g e p l o y m e c z s .  
( 6 )  V e r i f i c a t i o n  - -  
U . S . :  Z e r o - c p t i o n  w o u l d  s i n p i i f y  p r o b l e m .  
S o v i e t :  P r o v i s i o n s  a s s u r i n g  " a d e q u a t e  c o n t r o l t 1  o v e r  
c o m p l i c a n c e  w i t h  c o m R i t m e n t s .  
On Mar. 1 6 ,  1 9 8 2 ,  S o v i e t  P r e s i d e n t  B r e z h n e v  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
w o u l d  u n i l a t e r a l l y  f r e e z e  d e p l o y m e n t s  o f  new m e d i u m - r a n g e  a r m a m e n t s  i n  t h e  
E u r o p e a n  p a r t  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  B r e z h n e v  a l s o  s a i d  t h a t  d u r i n g  1 9 8 2 ,  
" u n l e s s  t h e r e  i s  a  new a g g r a v a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n , "  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  w o u l d  " r e d u c e  a  c e r t a i n  n u m b e r  o f  i t s  m e d i u m - r a n g e  m i s s i l e s  o n  
i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e . "  The S o v i e t  m o r a t o r i u m  w o u l d  b e  i n  f o r c e  " e i t h e r  u n t i l  
a n  a g r e e m e n t  i s  r e a c h e d w  i n  t h e  G e n e v a  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o r  u n t i l  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  b e g i n s  " p r a c t i c a l  p r e p a r a t i o n s  t o  d e p l o y  P e r s h i n g - 2  m i s s i l e s  a n d  
c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  i n  E u r o p e . "  
T h i s  m a r k e d  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  t h a t  a  S o v i e t  f r e e z e  p r o p o s a l  h a d  n o t  a s k e d  f o r  
a  r e c i p r o c a l  a c t i o n  by t h e  W e s t ,  s u c h  a s  p o s t p o n i n g  i t s  d e p l o y m e n t  d e c i s i o n .  
I t  was a l s o  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  t h a t  Moscow h a s  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  p u t  U.S.  t e r r i t o r y  
i n  j e o p a r d y  i f  new U . S .  m i s s i l e s  a r e  d e p l o y e d .  B r e z h n e v  s a i d  t h a t  W e s t e r n  
d e p l o y m e n t s  " w o u l d  c o m p e l  u s  t o  t a k e  r e t a l i a t o r y  s t e p s  t h a t  w o u l d  p u t  t h e  
o t h e r  s i d e ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i t s e l f ,  i t s  own t e r r i t o r y ,  i n  a n  
a n a l o g o u s  p o s i t i o n . "  T h i s  c o u l d  b e  a c c o m p l i s h e d  by  s t a t i o n i n g  n u c l e a r  
m i s s i l e s  i n  C u b a ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  o r  by e x t e n d i n g  t h e  p a t r o l s  o f  S o v i e t  n u c l e a r  
s u b m a r i n e s  c l o s e r  t o  U.S.  t e r r i t o r i a l  w a t e r s .  
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  B r e z h n e v  a r g u e d  f o r  t h e  r e s u m p t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  n u c l e a r  
a r m s  t a l k s  a n d  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w a s  r e a d y  t o  e x p a n d  " c o n f i d e n c e  
b u i l d i n g "  m e a s u r e s  t o  n a v a l  o p e r a t i o n s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  by  l i m i t i n g  t h e  p a t r o l  
p a t t e r n s  o f  n u c l e a r  m i s s i l e  s u b m a r i n e s .  W h i l e  n e i t h e r  s i d e  h a s  f o r m a l l y  
c h a n g e d  i t s  n e g o t i a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  i n  G e n e v a ,  t h e r e  h a v e  b e e n  a t t e m p t s  t o  r e a c h  
a g r e e m e n t  a n d  s i g n s  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y .  
I n  m i d - 1 9 8 3 ,  U.S.  a n d  S o v i e t  c h i e f  INF n e g o t i a t o r s  -- P a u l  N i t z e  a n d  Y u l i  
K v i t s i n s k y  -- r e p o r t e d l y  d i s c u s s e d  a  c o m p r o m i s e  p r o p o s a l  w h i c h  w o u l d  h a v e  
p e r m i t t e d  a  r e d u c e d  d e p l o y m e n t  o f  new U.S.  m i s s i l e s  w h i l e  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  t o  r e d u c e  i t s  i n t e r m e d i a t e  m i s s i l e  f o r c e .  T h e  a p p r o a c h  
r e p o r t e d l y  was r e j e c t e d  i n  Moscow a s  w e l l  a s  i n  W a s h i n g t o n .  
I n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 2 ,  Y u r i  A n d r o p o v ,  t h e  new S o v i e t  l e a d e r ,  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  
SS-20  d e p l o y m e n t s  i n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  b e  r e d u c e d  t o  
a r o u n d  1 6 2 ,  a p p r o x i m a t i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  B r i t i s h  a n d  F r e n c h  m i s s i l e s .  T h i s  
p r o p o s a l  was r e j e c t e d  by  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  F r a n c e ,  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  f o r  a 
n u m b e r  o f  r e a s o n s .  One c r i t i c i s m  was  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a d  n o t  o f f e r e d  
t o  r e d u c e  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  S S - 2 0 s ,  o n l y  t o  r e d e p l o y  t h e m  t o  A s i a n  l o c a t i o n s  f r o m  
w h e r e  t h e y  c o u l d  b e  r e t u r n e d  t o  E u r o p e  i n  a c r i s i s .  I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  
c r i t i c i s m ,  S o v i e t  o f f i c i a l s  r e p o r t e d l y  t o l d  a  v i s i t i n g  A m e r i c a n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
d e l e g a t i o n  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 8 3  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w o u l d  c o n s i d e r  d e s t r o y i n g  
some SS-20 m i s s i l e s  i n  a n  a r m s  c o n t r o l  a g r e e m e n t .  
P r o s p e c t s  
I n  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  m a j o r  p r o b l e m s  c o n f r o n t i n g  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
relate zo tne a s y ~ m e t r l e s  Se'+'een tne zwo slies. ;he Unlzed States and the 
S o v ~ s r  Unlon nave or are d e v e l s ? ~ c g  Z ~ i f e r e n t  x e a p o ~ s  systems wlth unlque 
c a ? a c - ~ ~ ~ ; e s  a e s z g ~ ~ e c  zo ssrve s z r a ~ e g l s s  Dasec on 2 i a s 1 m ~ ~ a r  assessments or 
s e c x r ~ r y  r e q u ~ r e m e n t s .  Il;uscratlve~y, the U n ~ z e d  Szates needs to ensure 
extended war deterrence for allles from wnlch L C  is geographically separated. 
The Soviet Unlon faces no such problem. On the other 9 a n d ,  the Soviet Unlon 
faces nunerous potentla1 enemles, the NATO allles, Chlna, and Japan as well 
a s  some European neutrals, and at least three nuclear powers -- France, the 
U.K., and C h ~ n a  -- ln addltzon to the Unrted States. The Unlted States, 
n e a n w h ~ l e ,  faces only the Sovlet Unron and ~ t s  Warsaw Pact allles and no 
nuclear power other than the Sovlet Unron. 
Finally, perhaps the greatest uncertainty is created by the current status 
of strategic a r m s  control. Negotiations on theater nuclear systems cannot 
likely conclude without the framework of a new U.S.-Soviet strategic arms 
agreement. This is true simply because there is a military and strategic 
continuum between long-range theater and strategic nuclear forces. Neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union could know what theater nuclear force 
levels would be acceptable until they knew with some greater certainty what 
the balance would look like a t  the strategic levei. Until strategic 
negotiations proceed toward a new agreement, there will likely be no final 
outcome in theater arms control negotiations. 
WXAT IS TEE OUTLOOK FOR THE NATO DECISION? 
The NATO dual-track decision was the product of a number of compromises 
which attempted to rationalize competing military, political, and economic 
requirements and constraints. Followed through to its conclusion, successful 
implementation of the decision would reduce the Soviet theater nuclear threat 
to NATO and yet permit deployment of sufficient new Western systems to 
strengthen extended deterrence. 
The choice by President Reagan of the "zero-optionw a s  the U.S. goal in 
negotiations illustrates the complexity of the problem. This objective, 
while politically attractive, is not fully consistent with the original 
rationale of the NATO decision which sought to reestablish credible linkage 
between the European theater and American strategic systems. 
Nuclear weapons issues have severely strained NATO unity in recent years. 
The advent of negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic a s  well a s  
intsrmediate nuclear weapons has reduced the pressure on allied governments, 
a t  least temporarily. The anti-nuclear movement will not g o  away, but its 
growth may be slowed a s  long a s  negotiations seem to offer some possibility 
of reducing nuclear systems. 
Perhaps the most important variable in the European nuclear equation is 
the political viability of American positions and performance. The Western 
allies will follow the United States, even down the road to deployment of new 
nuclear weapons systems, if U.S. positions accommodate European concerns. 
Overstatements of the threat, and failure to take into account European 
perceptions of constraints on the Soviet will or ability to attack Western 
Europe (for example, the questionable reliability of their Polish ally) will 
tend to undermine U.S. credibility in European eyes. 
Given that President Reagan's zero option proposal i s  widely recognized a s  
anacceptable to the Russians, an inflexible American defense of that approach 
would eventually undermine support of the U.S. negotiating position. By the 
spring of 1983, there 'ay be significant pressure in Western Europe for 
modification of the U.S. arns control offer. TP.e Reagan Administration 
percaps could ensure conclnued allied support of :ne 1979 aeclsion by 
offering to present some compromise approaches in Geneva in r e ~ u r n  for 
renewed allied conmitments to proceed with deployment plans. Without some 
such sign of flexibility, it may become increasingly difficult to present a 
united NATO front as the time for initial deployments draws near. 
In any case, the debate on nuclear weapons has raised a number of 
questions which the theater nuclear and START negotiations will not address 
and which allied governments will not be able to sweep back under the carpet. 
These issues relate in particular to NATO's strategy of flexible response, 
the role of shorter range and battlefield nuciear weapons, and NATO's 
conventional capabilities. It therefore seems likely that pressure will 
mount within the alliance for a full examination of NATO nuclear posture and 
strategy. Combined with the U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations, this process of 
negotiation within the alliance will be of crucial importance to the future 
of U.S.-European relations. 
THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS 
The Congress has played a limited role to date with regard to the NATO 
decision, although President Reagan's zero-option speech was widely applauded 
by Democrats as well as Republicans. In 1982, increased congressional 
interest in the subject was suggested by debate on nuclear freeze proposals 
and House and Senate hearings on the European nuclear weapons issues. And, 
the changes early in 1983 in the Administration's arms Control management 
team have provoked increased congressional interest in the potential 
implications of these changes for U.S. arms control policy. 
Furthermore, the Congress denied funding in FY83 defense appropriations 
for procurement of Pershing I1 missiles. The action was in response to 
dissatisfaction with the P-11's testing performance and the Senate and House 
conferees agreed that funding might be restored "following successful 
completion of full flight testing." 
LEGISLATION 
P.L. 97-377, H.J.Res. 631 
Continuing Appropriation, 1983. Making continuing appropriations for 
the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1983, and for other purposes. Reported to 
House by Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 97-959) Dec. 10, 1982. Passed 
House Dec. 12, 1982. Referred to the Senate Appropriations Committee. 
Reported to Senate by Appropriations Committee (without written report) Dec. 
15. Conference report filed in House Dec. 20. Passed House and Senate Dec. 
20. Signed into law Dec. 21. 1982. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
01/23/83 -- Frans Josef Strauss, leader of the Bavarian-based 
Christian Social Union in West Germany said in a 
radio interview that he no longer supported the 
zero-option negotiating approach. 
01/21/83 -- The Pershing I1 reportedly completed its first 
successful test flight. 
01/20/83 -- A faulty computer that monitors safety conditions 
at Cape Canaveral and bad weather forced a 
postponement of the third test firing of the P-I1 
missile. 
-- Reagan Administration source were reported to have 
said that Soviet negotiators had told their American 
counterparts at the START negotiations in Geneva in 
Nov. 8 2  that strategic arms negotiations would be 
halted if a single new intermediate range missile 
were deployed in Europe. 
01/18/83 -- Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, visiting Bonn, 
West Germany, accused the United States of trying 
I! C L o  kill an agreement" 1 2  Zensva rather chan 
trying to ac5.ieve cne. Bronykc c o n s '  ,,,~rne2 ths Soviet 
2 r i s n ' s  vzilingness ta d e s z r ~ y  some 35-26 x;ss~-es 
in an arms c o n ~ r o l  a g r e e x e ~ t  while redeploying 
ochers "behind a line in Siberia where they could 
no longer hit targets in Wesc Ecrope." 
Cl/l5/83 - -  7 cugene Rostow, foraer head cf the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, acknob?ledged tha: U.S. and 
Soviet negotiators in Geneva had lasc year developed 
an informal compromise approach to limiting U.S. 
and Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles in 
Europe. The approach, developec between U.S. 
representative to the 1 x 7  negotiaticns, Paul Nitze, 
and Soviet representative Yzli Kvitsinsky, reportedly 
would have permitted a reduzed fieployment of new U.S. 
missiles while requiring the S ~ v i e t  Union to reduce 
its intermediate range missiles. The approach was 
rejected by 30th Moscow and Washington. 
01/13/93 -- Secretary of State George Shultz met wlth the press 
one day following the ouscer of Zugene Rostow a s  head 
of the Arms Control and D ~ s a r m a n e n t  Agency to dlspute 
clalms that the A d n l n z s t r a t ~ o n ' s  arms control policzes 
were in dlsarray and to r e a f f ~ r a  "the p r e s ~ d e n t ' s  
firm dedication to pursue arms concrol agreements wlth 
the Sovlet Union. 
-- Hans Jochen Vogel, head of West Gernany's opposition 
Social Democratic Party, returning from talks in 
Moscow with Soviet leader Ycri Adropov, said that the 
Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate on the numSer 
of warheads, noc just the number of missiles, in the 
INF negotiations. 
01/11/83 - -  Soviet arms control negotiators reportedly told a 
visiting U.S. congressional delegation that the Soviet 
Union would consider destroying, rather than sinply 
re-deploying to Asia, SS-20 missiles in the context of 
an arms control agreement with =he United States. 
01/09/83 --  President Reagan ancounced that he would send Vice 
President Bush on a 12-day trip to Europe starting 
on January 30 to consult with the allies and address 
the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. 
01/02/83 --  French President Mitterrand said that France would 
not reduce the numSer of its nuclear missiles and 
called the U.S.-Soviet Geneva negotiations "none of 
our affair." 
12/23/82 -- The U.S. Army announced that a flight test of the 
Pershing I 1  missile scheduled fcr December had been 
postponed until January 1983. 
12/21/82 -- Soviet leader Andropov, in a ma:or Kremlin speech, 
made public a proposal under whzch the Sovie: Union 
would reduce the number of m e d i ~ n - r a n g e  sissiles 
:n Europe to aSout i52, eqxai z o  ckz ndrn~er cf 
missiles deployed S y  France and Greac 8 r ~ z a - c .  The 
3n:;ea S=az?s, Francs, - 2 3  (Greaz 5r:;;ln ;,- r2;ecced 
the proposal as unaccepkable. 
12/19/82 - -  Bouse and Senate Conferees agreed to provide no funcs 
for procurement of Pershing I I  missiles. The conference 
report, however, said that "The conferees nevertheless 
remain firmly committed to modernization of the theater 
nuclear forces" and agreed that "Pershing I1  
procurement funds may be requested by reprogramming or 
budget supplement following successful c o m p l e t i ~ n  of 
full flight testing.'' 
12/07/82 -- The Danish parliament froze Denmark's contribution to 
NATO infrastructure expenses associated with the 
planned deployment of new intermediate-range 
missiles. 
11/23/82 - -  The Army revealed that the Pershing I 1  missile test of 
Nov. 1 9  had not been a complete success as initially 
claimed. According to the Army, the warhead failed to 
maneuver properly and "did not achieve the desired 
accuracy." 
11/22/82 -- The new Dutch center-right coalition announced that it 
would proceed with "preparation for the deployment" 
of U.S. medium range missiles. Prime Minister LubSers 
told the Dutch parliament that arms control talks 
would be a "very importan factor" influencing whether 
the missiles would ultimately be deployed in the 
Netherlands. 
11/16/82 --  The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee voted to 
deny funding for procurement of the Pershing I1  
missile. 
11/12/82 -- Yuri Andropov succeeded Leonid Srez9nev two days 
following Brezhnev's death. 
10/01/82 --  The West German parliament voted to unseat Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt's government and elected Christian 
Democratic leader Helmut Kohl to succeed him. Kohl 
formed a coalition with the Free Democratic Party 
(Schmidt's former coalition partner) and with 
Bavaria's Christian Social Union, led by Franz 
Joseph Strauss. The new government pledged 
continued West German support for NATO's two-track 
decision on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. 
09/30/82 -- U.S. and Soviet negotiators resumed talks in Geneva on 
medium-range missiles in Europe. 
09/29/82 - -  Britain's opposition Labour Party voted overwhelmingly 
to abolish the U.K.'s nuclear weapons if the party 
wins the next election (anticipated i n  the autumn of 
1983) and to reject the deployment of any American 
nuclear cruise missiles in England. 
09/10/82 --  In a speech before the Los Anqeles World Affairs Council, 
ACDA Director Eugene V. Rostow gave a aetalled 
analysis of U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions in 
Geneva, concluding that "It is clear that a 
potentiality exists for accomnodatinq the analytic 
concepts used by both sides. What is not yet clear 
is whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept 
agreement based exclusively on the principle of 
deterrence." 
63/08/82 - -  NATO accused the Soviet Union of having completed 
three new SS-20 bases since mid-March, bringing 
the total of SS-20 missiles deployed to 324 with 972 
warheads, according to U.S. estimates. 
07/22/82 -- Seventeen seconds into the first full test flight of 
the Pershing I 1  missile, its first stage 
malfunctioned and the missile destroyed itself. 
07/01/82 --  The Soviet Union denied that it had deployed new 
SS-20 missiles west of the Ural Mountains since 
announcing a freeze on such deployments last March. 
(The denial came in response to charges made on 
June 30 by Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of 
State-designate for European Affairs, that the 
Soviet Union had recently completed additional 
SS-20 bases in spite of the freeze.) 
06/29/82 -- U.S. and Soviet negotiators began talks in Geneva 
on reducing strategic nuclear weapons. 
-- A peace caravan arrived in Rome from Sicily with 
petitions signed by 1 million Italians protesting 
plans to station U.S. cruise missiles in Comiso, 
Sicily. 
06/14/82 -- The Pentagon formally notified Congress that it 
plans to sell Trident submarine-launched missiles 
to the U.K. in a $3.9 billion purchase intended 
to modernize Britain's strategic nuclear forces. 
06/10/82 -- More than 300,000 persons rallied in opposition 
to U.S. defense policies in Bonn across the 
Rhine from the site of the NATO summit meeting. 
(The summit session reaffirmed allied commitments 
to the December 1979 modernization and arms control 
program for intermediate nuclear forces.) 
05/20/82 -- The U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediate nuclear 
weapons resumed in Geneva following a two-month recess. 
05/19/82 -- The U.S. Air Force announced that it had successfully 
launched a T-omahawk cruise, the fourth of 11 planned 
tests before scheduled deployment beginning in 1983. 
The missile flew for 906 miles after being launched at 
the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. 
0 5 / 1 8 / 8 2  - -  S o v i e t  P r e s i d e r t  S r e z h n e v ,  i n  a  Xoscow s p e e c h ,  a c c e p t e d  
P r e s i d e s :  Z e a g a n ' s  c a i l  f o r  s t r a t e g i c  a r a s  c 9 n t r o l  
t a i k s  9c: e x ~ r e s s e c  s k e p t l c i s i n  a a o u t  t h e  " i d e a s "  
i n c l u d e d  I n  t h e  U . S .  r e d u c t i o n  p r o p o s a l .  B r e z h n e v  
a l s o  a n n o x n c e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a d  b e g u n  t o  
r e d u c e  i t s  i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e  m i s s i l e s  i n  t h e  W e s t e r n  
USSR a n d  c o r i f i r n e d  h i s  o f f e r  t o  h a l t  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  
m i s s i l e  l a u n c h  p o s i t i o n s .  He a g a i n  r e j e c t e d  t h e  
W e s t ' s  c a l l  f o r  l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  S o v i e t  i n t e r m e d i a t e  
r a n g e  m i s s i l e s  " b e y o n d  t h e  U r a l s "  b u t  s a i d  t h a t  
s u c h  m i s s i l e s  w o u l d  n o t  t h r e a t e n  W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  a n d  
t h a t  n o  a d d i t i o n a l  m i s s i l e s  w o u l d  b e  d e p l o y e d  t h a t  
a r e  c a p a b l e  o f  r e a c h i n g  W e s t e r n  E u r o p e .  
0 5 / 0 9 / E 2  --  P r e s i d e n t  Z e a g a n ,  i n  a s p e e c h  a t  E u r e k a  C o l l e g e ,  
p r o p o s e d  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  U.S.  a n d  S o v i e t  n u c l e a r  
i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  m i s s i l e s  by  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
o n e - t h i r d .  
0 4 / 2 2 / 8 2  - -  T h e  n a t i o n a l  c o n g r e s s  o f  Wes t  German C h a n c e l l o r  
S c h m i d t ' s  S o c i a l  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y  d e f e a t e d  a  
p r o p o s a l  t o  h a l t  p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  d e p l o y m e n t  o f  new 
A m e r i c a n  i n t e r m e d i a t e  r a n g e  w e a p o n s  w h i l e  a r m s  
c o n t r o l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r e  u n d e r w a y  i n  G e n e v a .  T h e  
m o t i o n  on s e c u r i t y  e v e n t u a l l y  a d o p t e d  c a l l e d  f o r  a  
r e v i e w  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  a t  a  s p e c i a l  c o n v e n t i o n  
i n  1 9 8 3 .  
0 4 / 1 5 / 8 2  -- P r e s s  r e p o r t s  f r o m  Rome i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  p r e p a r a t i o n s  
h a d  b e g u n  a t  C o m i s o  i n  S i c i l y  o n  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  b a s e  
f o r  U . S . - b u i l t  c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s .  On A p r i l  4 ,  
a n t i - n u c l e a r  d e m o n s t r a t o r s  m o u n t e d  a  l a r g e  p r o t e s t  
m a r c h  t o  t h e  M a g l i o c c o  m i l i t a r y  a i r p o r t  n e a r  C o m i s o  
w h e r e  t h e  b a s e  i s  t o  b e  c o n s t r u c t e d .  
0 4 / 0 9 / 8 2  - -  S p o k e s m a n  f o r  b o t h  t h e  German  S o c i a l  D e m o c r a t i c  p a r t y  
a n d  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  C h r i s t i a n  D e m o c r a t s  e x p r e s s e d  
r e s e r v a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  b y  f o u r  f o r m e r  A m e r i c a n  
o f f i c i a l s  ( M c G e o r g e  B u n d y ,  R o b e r t  McNamara ,  G e o r g e  
K e n n a n ,  a n d  G e r a r d  S m i t h )  t h a t  N A T O  s h o u l d  r e n o u n c e  
f i r s t  u s e  o f  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  i n  d e f e n d i n g  E u r o p e  
a g a i n s t  c o n v e n t i o n a l  a t t a c k .  
0 4 / 0 7 / 8 2  --  P r e s s  r e p o r t s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  U.S .  Army w a n t s  t o  
b u i l d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  m o r e  P e r s h i n g  I 1  m i s s i l e s  t h a n  
i t  n e e d s  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e  N A T O  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  1 0 8 .  T h e  
Army r e p o r t e d l y  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  s e l l  a  " r e d u c e d  r a n g e "  
v e r s i o n  t o  Wes t  Germany  t o  r e p l a c e  e x i s t i n g  
n u c l e a r - a r m e d  P e r s h i n g  1 m i s s i l e s  d e p l o y e d  w i t h  t h e  
W e s t  German A i r  F o r c e .  
0 3 / 2 9 / 8 2  --  A W e s t  German o f f i c i a l  c o n f i r m e d  i n  a n  i n t e r v i e w  t h a t  
p r e p a r a t i o n s  a r e  u n d e r w a y  f o r  t h e  s i t i n g  o f  new 
A m e r i c a n  i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  i n  G e r m a n y .  
0 3 / 1 6 / 8 2  -- T h e  G e n e v a  n e g o t i a t i o n s  r e c e s s e d ,  a s  s c h e d u l e d ,  f o r  
t w o  m o n t h s  t o  p e r m i t  b o t h  s i d e s  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  
t h e  t a l k s .  

12/28/51 - -  In a column published in the New Ycrk Times, Flora 
Lewis reported that the Geneva negotiations had 
"gotten off to a good start" with Soviet 
negotiators putting their own estimaces of each 
side's arsenal on the table -- an uncommon practice 
for the Soviet Union. Lewis also reported that 
"The Russians are talking about meeting U.S. demands 
for better verification by the mutual exchange of 
tamper-procf 'Elack Scxes', instruments :o be 
installed by each side on the other side's launchers 
and then checked against cheating." 
12/25/81 - -  In a televised interview, President Reagan claimed 
that anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe were 
"bought and paid for by the Soviet Ucion." 
12/18/81 - -  The new Belgium government led by Flemish Social 
Christian Vilfried Martens announced its continued 
support for NATO's 1979 depioyment decision but 
said that Belgian acceptance of cruise missiles 
would still be examined every six months o n  the 
basis of developments in arms control negotiations 
12/17/81 - -  Soviet and American negotiators recessed their talks 
on intermediate nuclear weapons systens in Europe 
and s z h e ~ u l e d  re=:rnpclon for Saruary 1982. 
12/12/81 -- In talks with West German Chancellor Schmidt, East 
German leader Erich Honecker saiC that the future 
of inter-German relations was linked to West 
Germany's position on deployment of new American 
nuclear weapons. Honecker asserted chat "gocd 
neighborliness cannot flourish in the shadow of 
U.S. atomic missiles." 
12/06/81 -- Anti-nuclear demonstrations were held in a number of West 
European cities. 
12/05/81 -- An estimated 300,000 protestors rallied in Bucharest, Romania, 
t o  demonstrate for the removal of ali nuclear weapons from 
Europe. 
12/01/81 -- Richard Perie, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International 
Security Policy, testifying before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, said that the United States had no "fallback" 
position if the Soviets reject the zero-option proposal. 
Perle also said that any agreement must also limit other 
Soviet theater systems to prevent circumvention of the 
agreement. On verification, Perle said that "any treaty 
agreed upon must include verification measures that will 
al-nos? cey+=F~:y ~9 5elTo?3 +.he Yational technical means of 
verification on which the less complex agreements of the 
past have relied." 
ii/30/81 -- The United States and the Soviet Union beqan talks in Geneva 
on reducing nuclear weapons in Europe. Paul Nitze, leader 
of the U.S. delegation, characterized the meeting as "cordial 
and b u ~ i n e s s l i k e ~ ~  and his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, 
said that the meeting had been "very constructive." 
11/26/81 -- Soviet President Brezknev left Bonn, concluding talks with 
West German officials that began cn Nov. 22. BrezP.nev 
reiterated Moscow's proposal for a moratorium in new 
deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and 
said that the Soviet Union was willing to make "radical" 
cuts in its forces but viewed the Reagan 
"zero-option" proposal a s  inequitable to the Soviet Union. 
At the conclusion of che talks, it was announced that West 
Germany and the Soviet Union would Consult regularly about 
nuclear weapons in Europe during the course of U.S.-Soviet 
negotiations. 
11/21/31 -- An anti-nuclear demonstration in Amsterdam reportedly 
attracted over 300,000 demonstrators. 
11/18/81 - -  President Reagan, in a major foreign policy speech a t  
the National Press Club, announced that the United 
States would seek total elimination of Soviet SS-20, 
SS-4, and SS-5 missiles in return for cancellation of 
NATO'S deployment plans -- a so-called "zero-option." 
The President said that American negotiators would be 
willing to listen to and discuss Soviet proposals in 
the negotiations schedules to begin in Geneva on 
Nov. 30. He also said that his administration would 
seek to open Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 
with the Soviet Union "as soon a s  possible" in 1982. 
11/11/61 -- Anti-nuclear teach-ins were held at more than 100 
universities around the United States. 
11/05/81 -- The government of Sweden said that it believed there 
were nuclear torpedo warheads aboard the Soviet 
Whiskey-class submarine that went aground in Swedish 
territorial waters on Oct. 27, presumably in the 
course of a spy mission near a Swedish military facility. 
-- Secretary of Defense Weinberger, testifying before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the idea 
of a nuclear warning shot was only a "suggestion" of 
military planners in the 1960s and that "there is no 
precise NATO military plan" for a nuclear demonstration 
shot. Later in the day, the White House, State 
Department, and Defense Department issued statements 
saying that "NATO a number of years ago identified the 
so-called demonstration use a s  a possible option." The 
statement said that while "Secretary Haig was correct 
in noting that a demonstrative use is an option that 
has been considered by NATO, Secretary Weinberger is 
correct in saying that i t  has never been transferred 
:-/G;/“3: - -  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Scaz? a a - G ,  c s s z i i y l n g  c e f o r s  t . l e  S e n a t e  
Foreign R e l a z 2 o p . s  C o m n l t ~ e e ,  s a l d  t h a t  l n  t h e  e v e n t  
ci a  S o v l e t  i z v a s l o n  o f  W e s t e r n  Z u r o p e ,  N A T G  r n l g h t  
f l r e  o f f  a n n c l e a r  " d e m o n s t r a t i o n f '  s h o t  c o  w a r n  
Moscow o f  t h e  r ~ s k s  o f  continuing t h e  conflict. 
1 0 / 3 1 / 8 i  -- S o v i e t  l e a d e r  B r e z h n e v  w a s  q u o t e d  i n  t 3 e  w e s t  G e r m a n  
m a g a z i n e  S e r  S p i e g e l  a s  s a y i n g  t h a t  " e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e r e  
a r e  s o m e  who h o p e  t h a t  a n u c l e a r  was c o u l d  b e  c o n t a i n e d  
o n  E u r o p e a n  t e r r i t o r y  . . .  a l i m i t e d  n u c l e a r  w a s  i s  n o t  
p o s s i b l e . "  A c c o r d i n g  t o  B r e z h n e v ,  a n y  n u c l e a r  war,  i n  
E u r o p e  o r  e l s e w h e r e ,  " w o u l d  i n e v i t a b l y  a n d  i n e s c a p a S l y  t a k e  
o n  a  w o r l d w i d e  c h a r a c t e r . "  B r e z h n e v  a l s o  c o m m e n t e d  o n  
t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  a  " z e r o  o p t i o n "  o u t c o m e  i n  TN? 
n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  s a y i n g  t h a t  w h i l e  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  S S - 2 0 s  c o u l d  
b e  C o n t e m p l a t e d ,  i t  was " a b s u r d "  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  w o u l d  s c r a p  a l l  o f  i t s  S S - 2 0  m i s s i l e s  i n  
r e t u r n  f o r  n o  new W e s t e r n  d e p l o y m e n t s .  
1 ~ / 2 6 / 8 1  -- R o m a n i a n  P r e s i d e n t  N i c o l a e  C e a u s e s c u ,  o n  t h e  e v e  o f  a 
v l s i t  b y  W e s t  G e r m a n  P r e s i d e n t  K a r l  K a r s t e n s  t o  R o m a n i a ,  
c a l l e d  i n  i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  t w o  W e s t  G e r m a n  N e w s p a p e r s  f o r  
t > e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  r e m o v e  
n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  f r o m  E u r o p e .  C e a u s e s c u ,  a d v o c a t i n g  a n  
e n d  t o  t h e  n u c l e a r  arms r a c e ,  s a i d  t h a t  " T h i s  a p p l i e s  j u s t  
a s  much t o  s t o p p i n g  t h e  s t a t i o n i n g  o f  r o c k e t s  p r o d u c e d  b y  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a s  t o  w i t h d r a w i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  r o c k e t s . "  
1 0 / 2 5 / 8 1  -- A n t l - n u c l e a r  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  w e r e  h e l d  i n  B r u s s e l s ,  P a r i s ,  
O s l o ,  a n d  E a s t  B e r l i n .  T h e  B r . ~ s s e l s  demonstration 
r e p o r t e d l y  a t t r a c t e d  o v e r  2 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  
1 0 / 2 4 / 8 1  -- A n t i - n u c l e a r  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  a t t r a c t e d  a n  e s t i m a t e d  2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
p r o t e s t o r s  i n  Rome a n d  1 5 0 , 0 0 0  i n  L o n d o n .  
l 0 / 2 1 / 8 1  -- F o l l o w i n g  a s t r o n g  r e a c t i o n  i n  E u r o p e  a g a i n s t  P r e s i d e n t  
R e a g a n ' s  c o m m e n t s  o n  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  l i n i t e d  n u c l e a r  war 
i n  E u r o p e ,  t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e  i s s u e d  a s t a t e m e n t  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t ' s  t h o u g h t s  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t .  T h e  s t a t e m e n t  s a i d  
t h a t  " i n  a n u c l e a r  war, a l l  m a n k i n d  w o u l d  l o s e . "  F u r t h e r ,  
" T h e  e s s e n c e  o f  U n i t e d  S t a t e  n u c l e a r  s t r a t e g y  i s  t h a t  
n o  a g g r e s s o r  s h o u l d  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  
i n  E u r o p e  c o u l d  r e a s o n a b l y  b e  l i m i t e d  t o  E u r o p e . "  
-- T h e  D e f e n s e  M i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  NATO N u c l e a r  
P l a n n i n g  G r o u p ,  m e e t i n g  i n  G l e n e a g l e s ,  S c o t l a n d ,  r e a f i r m e d  
p l a n s  f o r  d e p l o y m e n t  o f  new N A T O  LRTNF. U . S .  S e c r e t a r y  
o f  D e f e n s e  W e i n b e r g e r ,  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  u r g i n g  o f  s o m e  
E u r o p e a n  d e f e n s e  m i n i s t e r ,  w e n t  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  g r o u p ' s  
e n d o r s e m e n t  o f  a " z e r o - o p t i o n w  a s  t h e  i d e a l  o b j e c t i v e  
o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  o n  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  
s y s t e m s .  I n  s u c h  a n  a p p r o a c h ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w o u l d  
f o r e g o  d e p l o y m e n t  o f  new LRTNF i n  r e t u r n  f o r  S c v i e t  
d i s m a n t l i n g  o f  i t s  m e d i u m - r a n g e  n u c l e a r  m i s s i l e  s y s t e m s .  
1 0 / 1 6 / 8 l  -- P r e s i d e n t  R e a g a n ,  a t  a m e e t i n g  w i t h  n e w s p a p e r  e d i t o r s ,  
was asked whether he believed that 2 nuclear weapors 
exchange with the Soviet Union could be limited tc Europe 
or woaid inevitably esealaze. The L=reslien: 
responded: I don'c honestly p now. I think again, until 
someplace -- all over the world this is being, research 
going o n ,  to try and find rhe defensive weapon. There never 
has been a weapon that someone hasn't come up with a defense. 
But it could -and t9e only defense is, well, you shoot yours 
and we'll shoot ours. I could see where you could have 
the exchange of tactical wespons against troops i n  the 
field without it bringing either one of the major powers 
to pushing the button." 
10/10/81 -- An anti-nuclear demonstration in Bonn, West Germany attracted 
an estimated 250,000 participants, including one member of 
the Presidium of Xelmut Schmidt's Social Democratic ?arty. 
10/05/81 -- NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Bernard Rogers, 
commenting on President Reagan's decision to place nuclear 
armed cruise missiles on attack submarines, said that the 
the decision would be used by European anti-nuclear forces 
to argue in favor of modernizing NATO's theater nuclear 
capabilities by deploying new systems a t  sea, not on land. 
10/02/81 -- The Italian Chamber of Deputies approved by a 244 to 225 
vote the Italian government's plan to allow deployment of 
American cruise missiles in Siczly if U.S.-Soviet arms 
reduction negotiations should fail. 
-- President Reagan announced a series of strategic weapons 
decisions including scrapping the multiple protective 
shelter system for the MX missile, constructing the 5-1 
bomber, and basing nuclear-armed cruise missiles on U.S. 
attack submarines. 
09/24/81 -- In a terse U.S.-Soviet joint announcement, worked 
out the day before by Secretary of State Haig a n d  
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the two countries 
pledged "to spare no effort" to reach an 
agreement on reducing medium-range theater nuclear 
forces i n  Europe. Negotiations were scheduled 
to begin on Nov. 30 in Geneva. The announcement 
noted that the U.S. negotiating team would be led 
by Paul Nitze and the Soviet side by Ambassador 
U.A. Kvitsinsky. 
09/23/81 -- In a n  address to a conference in Brussels, Richard Burt, 
the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs 
in the State Department, said that the U.S. agreed to the 
NATO LRTNF decision "in the full knowledge that the Soviet 
Union would most likely respond to an attack o n  its 
homeland by U.S. systems in Europe with an attack on the 
United States. Thus the emplacement of long-range U.S. 
cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe makes 
escalation of any nuclear war in Europe to involve an 
intercontinental exchange more likely, not less." 
09/16/81 -- According to a report published in the Washington 
P o s t ,  t h e  West G e r m a n  g o v e r n m e n t  a s k e d  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  t o  c o n s i d e r  p o s t p o n i n g  t h e  f i r s t  d e p l o y m e n t  
o f  P e r s h i n g  1 1  missiles o n  G e r m a n  t e r r i c c r y  t o  
c o i n c i d e  w i t h  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n i n g  o f  c r u i s e  
m i s s i l e s  on  I t a l i a n  t e r r i t o r y .  ( B o t h  w e r e  
s c h e d u l e d  t o  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 3 ,  b u t  s o m e  
h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t e c h n i c a l  f a c t o r s  m i g h t  d e l a y  
t h e  I t a l i a n  d e p l o y m e n t  u n t i l  A p r i l  1 9 8 4 . )  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  H a i g ,  o n  S e p t .  1 4  i n  B o n n ,  
d e n i e d  t h a t  t h e  U .S .  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  a n y  d e l a y  i n  
t h e  P e r s h i n 9  d e p l o y m e n t s  a n d  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  m i s s i l e  
d e p l o y m e n t  p r o g r a m  was o n  s c h e d u l e .  
0 ~ / 0 1 / ~ 1  -- A r e s e a r c h  memorandum p u b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  U . S .  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  A g e n c y  b a s e d  o n  new 
W e s t  E u r o F e a n  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  d a t a  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  h a r d - c o r e  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  s t a t i o n i n g  
o f  new l o n g - r a n g e  t h e a t e r  m i s s i l e s  i n  W e s t e r n  
E u r o p e  b u t  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  d o  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  
" c o n v e n t i o n a l  w i s d o m  o f  m a n y  j o u r n a l i s t s "  a n a l y s e s  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t  f o r  LRTNF 
s t a t i o n i n g  i n  W e s t e r n  E u r o p e . "  
0 8 / 2 1 / 8 1  -- W e s t  G e r m a n  C h a n c e l l o r  S c h m i d t  r e a f f i r m e d  h i s  s u p p o r t  
f o r  s t a t i o n i n g  o f  e n h a n c e d  r a d i a t i o n  w a r h e a d s  i n  
E u r o p e  p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  h i s  e a r l i e r - s t a t e d  t h r e e  
c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  m e t .  T h e  t h r e e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  t h a t  
t h e  F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  n o t  be  t h e  o n l y  NATO c o u n t r y  
w h i c h  a c c e p t s  s t a t i o n i n g  o f  s u c h  w e a p o n s ,  t h a t  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  b e  t a k e n  b y  NATO a s  a w h o l e ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  
d e p l o y m e n t  t a k e  p l a c e  o n l y  i f  arms c o n t r o l  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i c n  f a i l  t o  a c h i e v e  
r e s u l t s .  
0 8 / 0 6 / 8 1  -- P r e s i d e n t  R e a g a n  a u t h o r i z e d  f u l l  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
e n h a n c e d  r a d i a t i o n  w a r h e a d s  f o r  t h e  L a n c e  m i s s i l e  
a n d  8 - i n c h  a r t i l l e r y  s h e l l s .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  o r d e r e d  
t h a t  t h e  w e a p o n s  b e  s t o c k p i l e d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
a n d  s a i d  t h a t  a n y  f u t u r e  d e p l o y m e n t  i n  E u r o p e  w o u l d  
b e  d o n e  o n l y  a f t e r  f u l l  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  a l l i e s .  
0 7 / 2 3 / 8 1  -- A W e s t  G e r m a n  g o v e r n m e n t  s p o k e s m a n  a n n o u n c e d  
t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  R e a g a n  h a d  s e n t  C h a n c e l l o r  
S c h m i d t  a l e t t e r  p l e d g i n g  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o n  
LRTNF w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w o u l d  b e g i n  b e t w e e n  
m i d - N o v e m b e r  a n d  m i d - D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 1 .  
0 7 / 1 3 / 8 1  -- S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  H a i g ,  i n  a m a j o r  p o l i c y  
s p e e c h ,  o u t l i n e d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  R e a g a n  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  arms c o n t r o l  p o l i c y .  H a i g  s a i d  
t h a t  arms c o n t r o l  " c a n n o t  b e  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
c e n t e r p i e c e  o r  t h e  c r u c i a l  b a r o m e t e r  o f  
U . S . - S o v i e t  r e l a t i o n s "  a n d  t h a t  u n d e r  t h e  
R e a g a n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  arms c o n t r o l  e f f o r t s  
" w i l l  b e  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  o f ,  n o t  a r e p l a c e m e n t  
f o r ,  a c o h e r e n t  A l l i e d  s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y . "  H a i g  
r e i t e r a t e d  t h e  A m e r i c a n  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  b e g i n  
TNF n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  b e t w e e n  
- , - -  ; d r ; ~ ~  tse vls : :  zo X S ~ Z Z X  of P V E S C  Zsrzan 
Sot-a: Demccrazlc Party C?,a;rvan Jllly   and^, 
Scviet ?resident 3rezhnev rei:eratGd his offer 
to dsclare a rnoratorlum on d e p i s y ~ e n t  3 5  new 
cheater nuclear X I - s s ~ l e  systems 5ur1ng 
cegotiat;ons with the U n ~ t e d  States if the 
West will agree also coy to deploy new systems 
during the course of tne ?iegotla~ions. 
2 5 / 3 ~ / 8 1  - -  In a n  intervzew wlth F r a n k f u r ~ e r  l?undschau, a 
W e s ~  German newspaper, Chancellor Schrriec 
acknowleeged that hls governnenz had orlglnally 
favored D a s ~ n g  new NATO tkeater nuclear s y s ~ e m s  
a t  sea but had aaandonsd the position in view 
of financial and arms control c o n s ~ d e r a t l o n s .  
05/27/81 --  Soviet President Brezhnev, in response to 
q u e s ~ i o n s  posed 3y a Finnish newspaper, softened 
Moscow's traditional opposition to inclcsion of 
Soviet terrizcry in a n'lclear free zone in 
Northern Europe. Brezhnev reportedly said that 
the USSR "does not preclude the possiSility 
of considering the question of some other 
measures applying to our own territory in the 
region adjoining the nuclear-free zone in 
the north of Europe." The shift was interpreted 
by many Western observers a s  another element 
in a Soviet campaign to encourage splits between 
the United States and Zuropean countries on 
nuzlear issues. 
C5/22/81 -- In testimony before the Ssnate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Eugene Rostow, designated by 
President Reagan to head 'he U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmacent Agency, suggested that the 
Administration might not be prepared to resume 
strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet 
Union until Karch 1982. 
C5/2:/81 -- Over :20,000 leaders and members of West 
Germany's major Protestant federation concluded 
a four-day meeting in Earnburg which featured 
demonstrations for a nuclear-free Europe and 
against NATO's TN? modernization plans. 
06/17/81 - -  At the eighth meeting of NATO's "Special 
Consultative Groap" which is responsible for 
developing and coordinating the Western 
approach to TN9 negotiations, the United States 
reported on the status of U.S.-Soviet 
preparatory contacts on the issue. 
C5/09/81 --  At a Kremlin dinner for the visiting Algerian 
president, President BrezP-nev questioned the 
siccerity of the Reagan Adninistration's 
pledge to begin n e g o t i a t i ~ n s  on theater nuclear 
systems. 3rezhnev sale tnat Admlnlstratlon 
s t a t e m e n ~ s  are "aere words" deslgnec to " 1 ~ 1 1  
1:s a-iles ana put-LC oplnlcn." J e  crLar5ea c r . a ~  
tne J n ~ t e d  States had yet to take "a slngle 
real step" toward negot;atrons acd aceused 
Washington of e m D a r k ~ n g  on an "unprecedentee" 
arms race. 
06/05/81 -- The New York Times reported that the United 
S ~ a t e s  and the Soviet Union had agreed to 
begin talks in Washington in "the next few 
weeks" to prepare for negotiations later in 
the year on limiting medium-range theater 
nuclear forces. 
-- The West German magazine Der Speigel 
published an interview with Vadim Zagladin, 
member of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which 
Zagladin said that once negotiations on 
medium-range missiles started, the Soviet 
Union would be prepared to refrain from 
deploying new weapons and to call a halt 
to a l l  deployment programs. H e  also said 
that the Soviet Union favored making Europe a 
denuclearized zone. 
05/13/81 --  The NATO defense ministers concluded a meeting 
of the Defense Planning Committee with a 
communique that noted NATO's intention to 
"move ahead with its planned schedule o f  
long-range theater nncl2ar force (LZTNF) 
modernization whilst a t  the same time making 
efforts to reach balanced, equitable and 
verifiable arms control agreements limiting 
such forces..." T h e  ministers also "welcomed 
the intention of the United States to begin 
negotiations with the Soviet Union by the end 
of the year on theater nuclear force arms 
control within the SALT framework..." 
05/05/81 -- NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Rome, 
emphasized in their communique that "in 
light of increasing Soviet LRTNF deployments 
which i n  the case of the SS-20 already exceed 
the total LRTNF deployment planned by NATO, the 
modernizing of NATO's LRTNF i s  more essential 
than ever, and offers the only realistic basis 
for parallel TNF arms control..." 
35/04/81 -- It was reported that President Reagan had sent 
a letter to Soviet President Brezhnev signaling 
his administration's willingness to begin 
talks this year on limiting theater nuclear 
systems in Europe. 
04/19/81 --  An estimated 6,000 anti-nnclear demonstrators 
representing a number of West Europeac countries 
narcned to NATO headquarters 12 r~.e s u z s ~ ~ r z s  
of Brussels to protest NATO L2T::F d e p l ~ > ~ ~ e n z  
;,ar.s. 
04/08/81 - -  Defense Einisters of countries p a r t i c i p a c ~ n g  in 
NATO's Nuclear 'lanning Group meeting in Sonn 
reaffirmed willingness to open negotiations 
with the Soviet Unisn on theater nuclear systems 
but warned that Soviet interventicn in "laand 
"would gravely undermine the basis for effective 
arms control negotiation." 
03/02/81 - -  A report issued by the General Accountinq Cffice 
concluded that Pershing I 1  testing to date 
had produced "encouraging" results but that 
most of the critical hardware tests were still 
to be accomplished in a schedule which has been 
compressed to meet NATO deployment commitments. 
The report also noted that several technical 
problems with the Ground Launched Cruise ifissile 
remain to b e  resolved and have delayed the start 
of operational tests and production of the 
system. 
02/23/81 - -  In his report to the 25th Soviet Party 
Congress, President Brezhnev proposed a 
moratorium o n  deployment in Europe of new 
medium-range nuclear missile facilities of the 
NATO countries and the Soviet Union. Accordicg 
to Erezhnev, "This moratorium could come into 
force immediately as soon a s  negotiations on 
this question commence, and would be e f f e c t ~ v e  
until a permanent treaty o n  limitation o r ,  evec 
better, on reduction of such nuclear facilities 
in Europe i s  concluded." 
02/03/81 - -  Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in a press 
conference, said that the Reagan Administration 
might g o  ahead with production of enhanced 
radiation warheads (the so-called neutron 
bomb. ) 
12/12/80 -- NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels took 
note of preliminary discussions held between 
U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Geneva during 
October and November on theater nuclear force 
reductions. They agreed that "A date for 
resumption of U.S.-Soviet exchanges next year 
will S e  set through mutual consultations." The 
ministers also noted that the withdrawal of 
1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe a s  
an integral part of the LRTNF modernization 
and arms control decision had been completed. 
10/16/80 -- The United States and the Soviet Union opened 
preliminary talks in Geneva on theater nuclear 
force limitations. 
T5e Belgian government lndeflnitely poscp3ned 
a final dec;slon on whether or not to accept 
s t a z ~ o n l n g  of crxise r,;;s;~es on Se-glan 
t e r r ~ t o r y  p e n d ~ n g  the development of arms 
control negotiations between the Unlted States 
and the Sovlet Unlon. The government said that 
~t would reexamine the questlon every slx 
months. 
-- It was reported that Soviet President Brezhnev 
had sent letters to President Carter and other 
NATC leaders complaining that the West had not 
responded to his offer to begin negotiations 
on theater nuclear systems. 
- - It was reported that Secretary of Defense 
Brown had sent a message to the NATO allies 
assuring them that the new U.S. nuclear 
strategy ontlined in Presidential Directive 59 
did not represent a major break in the evolution 
of U.S. nuclear strategy and was intended to 
enhance deterrence. (Reports of a more 
flexible U.S. targeting doctrine had led some 
Europeans to believe that the United States 
was moving toward a greater willingness to 
contemplate fighting limited nuclear war in 
Europe.) 
- - During talks in Moscow, Soviet President 
Brezhnev told Chancellor Schmidt that the 
Soviet Union would not persist with its 
insistence that NATO rencunce its LRTNF 
deployment plans before U.S.-Soviet negotiations 
could begin to seek East-West limitations on 
such systems. 
-- NATO established a Special Consultative 
Group on Arms Control involving Theater 
Nuclear Forces (to succeed the special study 
group formed in 1979.) 
- - It was reported that the Soviet Union had 
sent a note to the United States claiming 
that NATO's decision to deploy new theater 
nuclear systems in Europe had "destroyed the 
basis for negotiations" on limiting theater 
nuclear arms. 
-- The White House announced that it had requested 
a postponement of the Senate debate on the 
SALT I1 treaty in the wake of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
-- The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. 
- - At a special meeting of NATO foreign and 
defense ministers, the NATO countries decided 
to go ahead with modernization of the West's 
" r o p e - b a s e e  l o n g - r a n g e  t 9 e a c e r  n u c l e a r  s y s t e m s  
? y  y e p l o y i n q  ( i n  1983, 2: ~ 2 s  e a r l i e a t \  a t o t a l  
,- - - - , - 5 7 2  n e e  s y s c e n s  i;'8 " " r s h ~ n g  ,, a n -  is* 
g r o u n d  l a a n c h e d  c r : i s e  ' i s s i l e s  c a p a b l e  
o f  s t r i k i ~ g  S o v i e t  t e r r i t o r y ) .  ? ? e  d e s l s i c n  
r e c o m m e n d e d  d e p l o y n e n :  i n  5 E u r o ~ e a n  c o - n t r i e s :  
1 0 8  P e r s h i n g  11 l a ' ~ n c h e r s  a n d  2 4  GLCY l a u n c h e r s  
( 9 6 )  m i S S i l ~ 3  i n  W e s t  G e r n a n y ;  4 0  G L C F  l a ~ n c h e r s  
( 1 6 0 )  m i s s i l e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ;  26  G L C K  
l a u n c h e r s  ( 1 1 2  m i s s i l e s )  i n  I r a l y ;  1 2  G L C X  
l a u n c h e r s  ( 4 3  m i s s i l e s )  i n  a e l g l u m ;  a n d  1 2  
G L C X  l a u n c h e r s  ( 4 8  m i s s i l e s )  i n  T h e  N e ~ n e r l a n d s .  
A t  t h e  s a n e  t i m e ,  l < A F C  e x p r e s s e d  i t s  w i l l i n o : : e s s  
t o  n e g o t i a t e  l i m i t s  o n  t h i s  d e p l o y m e n t  i n  
e X c r , a n g e  f o r  r e c i p r o c a l  S o v i e t  l i n i t a t i o n s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  o n  t h e  new n o b i l e  a n d  a c c u r a 7  - e  
S S - 2 0  m i s s i l e  s y s t e m  b a s e d  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  
T h e  N A T O  a l l i e s  a l s o  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  w o u l d  u n i l a t e r a l l y  w i t h d r a w  a t o t a l  
o f  1 , 0 0 0  o b s o l e s c e n t  n u c l e a r  w a r h e a d s  f r o m  
W e s t e r n  E u r o p e .  
1 0 / 0 6 / 7 9  -- S o v i e t  President B r e z h n e v  o f f e r e d  t o  l l m l t  
d e p l o y m e n t  o f  S S - 2 0  m i s s l l e s  i f  t h e  N o r z h  
A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  O r g a n l z a t l o n  w o u l d  d e f e r  a  
d e c i s i o n  t o  d e p l o y  new W e s t e r n  s y s t e m s .  
0 6 / 1 8 / 7 9  -- T h e  SALT I 1  t r e a t y  w a s  s i g n e d  b y  P r e s i d e n t  
C a r t e r  a n d  P r e s i d e n t  B r e z h n e v  i n  V i e n n a .  
0 4 / 1 1 / 7 9  -- NATO e s t a b l i s h e d  a S p e c l a 1  G r o u p  L O  s t u d y  
a r m s  c o n t r o l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  
s j r s t e r n s .  
1 0 / 2 8 / 7 7  -- West G e r m a n  C h a n c e l l o r  S c h m i d t ,  i n  a s p e e c h  t o  
t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S ~ r a t e g i c  
S t u d i e s  i n  L o n d o n ,  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  new r e a l i t y  
o f  s t r a t e g i c  p a r i t y ,  a s  c o d i f i e d  b y  SALT, 
m a g n i f i e d  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  d i s p a r i t i e s  
i n  t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  a n c  c o n v e n t i o n a l  w e a p o n s .  
He e m p h a s i e d  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  arms l i m i t a t i o n s  
c o n f i n e d  t o  U . S .  a n d  S o v i e t  c e n t r a l  s y s t e m s  
w o u l d  i n e v i t a b l y  i n p a i r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  West 
E u r o p e a n  N A T O  a l l i e s .  He c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  
d i s p a r i t i e s  o f  m i l i L a r y  p o w e r  i n  E u r o p e  w o u l d  
h a v e  t o  b e  r e m o v e d  i n  p a r a l l e l  w i t h  t h e  SALT 
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
1 0 / 1 2 / 7 7  - -  N A T O  e s t a b l i s h e d  a " H i g h  L e v e l  G r o u p  ( H L G ) "  
t o  s t u d y  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  NATO's t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  
p o s t u r e .  T h e  g r o u p  was d i r e c t e d  z o  s t c d y  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  NATC1s  s t r a t e g y  o f  t h r e e  
f a c t o r s :  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  p a r i t y ;  
t h e  o n g o i n g  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  o f  S o v i e t  t h e a t e r  
f o r c e s ;  a n d  t h e  g r o w i n g  o b s o l e s c e n c e  o f  e x i s t i n g  
N A T O  t h e a t e r  f o r c e s .  
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m o d e r n i z a t i o n .  W a s h i n g t o n  1 9 8 1 .  MASAD-81-15, 2 5  p .  
A t  h e a d  o f  t i t l e :  By t h e  C o m p t r o l l e r  G e n e r a l .  
R e p o r t  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  
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SOVIET AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON THE BALANCE* 
United States Assessment of Intermediate Range Nuclear Balance 
U.S. - Soviet 
Missiles ...................... 0 
F-111 fighter-bombers ......... 164 ............. F-4s :............ 265 
A-6s and A-7s ................. 6 8 
FB-111s ....................... 6 3 
(Stationed in U.S. for 
use in Europe) - 
SS-20s ...................... 340 ............. SS-4s and SS-5s 250 
SS-12s and SS-22s ........... 100 ..................... SS-N-5s 30 
TU-26 Backfire bombers ...... 45 
TU-16 Badgers and 
TU-22 Blinders ........... 350 
SU-17, SU-24 and MIG-27 
f ighter-bombers .......... 2,700 





.......... Land-based missiles 496 - 
I?-111 .......................... 172 (SS-203, SS-58, SS-4s) ........... FB-111 ......................... 65 Submarine missiles 18 ......... F-4 ............................ 246 Medium-range bombers 461 ....................... A-6. A-7 240 
U.K. - (Backfire, Badger, ~linder) - 
Polaris missiles ............... 64 
Vulcan bombers ................. 55 
France 
Land-based missiles ............ 18 
Submarine missiles ............. 80 
Mirage-4 bombers ............... 46 
* From various sources including U.S. State Department, New York Times, 
Arms Control Association. 
